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Abstract
Social influence has been shown to create significant unpredictability in cultural
markets, providing one potential explanation why experts routinely fail at predicting
commercial success of cultural products. To counteract the difficulty of making ac-
curate predictions, “measure and react” strategies have been advocated but finding a
concrete strategy that scales for very large markets has remained elusive so far.
Here we propose a “measure and optimize” strategy based on an optimization policy
that uses product quality, appeal, and social influence to maximize expected profits in
the market at each decision point. Our computational experiments show that our policy
leverages social influence to produce significant performance benefits for the market,
while our theoretical analysis proves that our policy outperforms in expectation any
policy not displaying social information.
Our results contrast with earlier work which focused on showing the unpredictabil-
ity and inequalities created by social influence. Not only do we show for the first time
that dynamically showing consumers positive social information under our policy in-
creases the expected performance of the seller in cultural markets. We also show that,
in reasonable settings, our policy does not introduce significant unpredictability and
identifies “blockbusters”.
Overall, these results shed new light on the nature of social influence and how it
can be leveraged for the benefits of the market.
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1 Introduction
Prediction in cultural markets is a wicked problem: On the one hand, experts routinely fail
at predicting commercial success for items such as movies, books, and songs [1, 2, 3, 7, 14]
while, on the other hand, hit products are generally considered qualitatively superior to
the less successful ones [24]. If those hit products are of superior quality, why can’t experts
detect them a priori? As Duncan Watts puts it, in cultural markets “everything is obvious
... once you know the answer,” as experts find it extremely hard to benefit from their
specific knowledge [4].
In their seminal paper [17], Salganik, Dodds, and Watts offer a satisfactory explanation
for this paradox: The impact of social influence on the behavior of individuals (word-of-
mouth), a process a priori invisible to experts, may distort the quality perceived by the
customers, making quality and popularity out of sync and expert predictions less reliable.
To investigate this hypothesis experimentally, they created an artificial music market called
theMusicLab. Participants in theMusicLab were presented a list of unknown songs from
unknown bands, each song being described by its name and band. The participants were
divided into two groups exposed to two different experimental conditions: The independent
condition and the social influence condition. In the first group (independent condition),
participants were provided with no additional information about the songs. Each partic-
ipant would decide which song to listen to from a random list. After listening to a song,
the participant had the opportunity to download it. In the second group (social influence
condition), each participant was provided with an additional information: The number of
times the song was downloaded by earlier participants. Moreover, these participants were
presented with a list ordered by the number of downloads. Additionally, to investigate
the impact of social influence, participants in the second group were distributed in eight
“worlds” evolving completely independently. In particular, participants in one world had
no visibility about the downloads and the rankings in the other worlds.
The MusicLab provides an experimental testbed of measuring the unpredictability
of cultural markets. By observing the evolution of different words given the same initial
conditions, the MusicLab provides unique insights on the impact of social influence and
the resulting unpredictability. In particular, Salganik et al suggested that social influence
contributes to both unpredictability and inequality of success, with follow-up experiments
confirming these initial findings [19, 18, 13, 23] (see also [6] for a perspective on the Mu-
sicLab paper). These experimental results received further theoretical support by the
development of a generative model that reproduces the experimental data [10]. The Musi-
cLab model, which is presented below, teased out the role of the quality and appeal of the
songs and position bias in the unpredictability and inequality of the experimental market.
Together these results painted a bleak scenario for cultural markets. From the stand-
point of the market, e.g., producers and consumers of cultural products, this is an inefficient
situation [21, 22, 8]: Fewer cultural products are consumed overall and some high-quality
products may go unnoticed, while lower-quality ones are oversold. It is thus an important
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open question to determine whether this situation can be remedied and how. In [24], Watts
advocates the use of “measure and react” strategies to address the difficulty in making cor-
rect predictions: “Rather than predicting how people will behave and attempting to design
ways to make customers behave in a particular way [...] we can instead measure directly how
they respond to a whole range of possibilities and react accordingly” [24]. The MusicLab
provides a unique setting to validate the benefits of a “measure and react” strategy.
This paper presents a “measure and optimize” (M&O) algorithm, that is a “measure
and react” algorithm which maximizes expected downloads at each decision point. In the
MusicLab, the only degree of freedom is the playlist presented to an incoming participant.
Each ranking policy for the playlist produces a “measure and react” algorithm. The original
MusicLab experiments presented one such policy: To rank the songs by number of down-
loads. Our “measure and optimize” algorithm in contrast uses a performance ranking that
maximizes the expected downloads globally for the incoming participant, exploiting the
quality and appeal of each song, the position visibilities in the playlist, and social influence.
The performance ranking is based on two insights.
1. It uses the generative MusicLab model that describes the probability of sampling a
song given its quality, appeal, position in the playlist, and the downloads of all songs
at some point in time.
2. It solves the resulting global optimization problem in strongly polynomial time by a
reduction to the Linear Fractional Assignment Problem, meaning that the algorithm
scales to large instances and avoid exploring the n! possible rankings.
In addition, since the quality of the songs is not known a priori, our M&O algorithm learns
them over time, using an often overlooked insight by Salganik et al. [17]: The fact that
the popularity of a song in the independent condition is a natural measure of its quality,
capturing both its intrinsic “value” and the preferences of the participants.
The M&O algorithm was evaluated on a simulated version of the MusicLab based on
the model proposed in [10]; It was compared to the download ranking policy used in the
original MusicLab experiments [17] and a random ranking policy. These ranking policies
were evaluated both under the social influence and independent conditions.
Regarding efficiency, the computational results contain two important highlights:
1. TheM&O algorithm produces a significant increase in expected downloads compared
to other tested policies.
2. The M&O algorithm leverages both position bias and social influence to maximize
downloads, providing substantial gains compared to ranking policies under the inde-
pendent condition.
These performance results are robust, not an artifact of distributions and parameters used
in experimental setting. Indeed, our theoretical results show that a performance-ranking
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policy always benefits from social influence and outperforms all policies not using social
influence in expectation. The performance results also shed light on recent results that
demonstrated the benefits of position bias in the absence of social influence [11]. Our
computational results show that a performance-ranking policy can leverage both social
influence and position visibility and that the improvements in expected downloads are
cumulative.
Regarding unpredictability, our results are also illuminating. They highlight that the
performance-ranking policy often identifies “blockbusters”, which are the primary sources
of the increased market efficiency. This provides a sharp contrast to the download rank-
ing, which cannot identify these blockbusters reliably. Moreover, even in that worst-case
scenario, our computational results show that the performance ranking brings significant
benefits over the download ranking.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the performance-ranking policy is general-
purpose and can be applied to a variety of cultural markets, including books and movies,
where product appeal, position visibility, and social influence can be optimized jointly.
2 Results
We first describe the MusicLab model proposed in [10], the experimental setting, and a
presentation of the various ranking policies. We then show how to estimate the qualities of
the songs. We then report the core computational results about the performance and
unpredictability of the various ranking policies. We finally prove that social influence
always helps the performance ranking in maximizing the expected downloads. As a result,
the performance ranking under social influence outperforms all ranking policies under the
independent condition.
2.1 The MusicLab Model
The descriptive model for the MusicLab [10] is based on the data collected during the
actual experiments and is accurate enough to reproduce the conclusions in [17] through
simulation. The model is defined in terms of a market composed of n songs. Each song
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is characterized by two values:
1. Its appeal Ai which represents the inherent preference of listening to song i based only
on its name and its band;
2. Its quality qi which represents the conditional probability of downloading song i given
that it was sampled.
The MusicLab experiments present each participant with a playlist pi, i.e., a permutation
of {1, . . . , n}. Each position p in the playlist is characterized by its visibility vp which is
the inherent probability of sampling a song in position p. Since the playlist pi is a bijection
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from the positions to the songs, its inverse is well-defined and is called a ranking. Rankings
are denoted by the letter σ in the following, pii denotes the song in position i of the playlist
pi, and σi denotes the position of song i in the ranking σ. Hence vσi denotes the visibility
of the position of song i. The model specifies the probability of listening to song i at time
k given a playlist σ as
pi,k(σ) =
vσi(αAi +Di,k)∑n
j=1 vσj (αAj +Dj,k)
,
where Di,k is the number of downloads of song i at time k and α > 0 is a scaling factor
which is the same for all songs. Observe that the probability of sampling a song depends
on its position in the playlist, its appeal, and the number of downloads at time k. As an
experiment proceeds, the number of downloads dominates the appeal of the song at a rate
dictated by α.
When simulating the independent condition, the download countsDi,k in the probability
pi,k(σ) becomes zero and hence the probability of listening to song i only depends on the
appeals and visibilities of the songs. We obtain a probability
pi(σ) =
vσiAi∑n
j=1 vσjAj
2.2 The Experimental Setting
The experimental setting in this paper uses an agent-based simulation to emulate the Mu-
sicLab. Each simulation consists of N iterations and, at each iteration k,
1. the simulator randomly selects a song i according to the probability distribution
specified by the pj.k’s.
2. the simulator randomly determines, with probability qi, whether selected song i is
downloaded; If the song is downloaded, then the simulator increases the download
counts of song i, i.e., Di,k+1 = Di,k + 1.
The “measure and react” algorithms studied in this paper monitors the above process (e.g.,
to estimate song quality). Every r iterations, the algorithms compute a new playlist σ using
one of the ranking policies described below. For instance, in the social influence condition
of the original MusicLab experiments, the policy ranks the songs in decreasing order of
download counts. The parameter r ≥ 1 is called the refresh rate.
The experimental setting tries to be close to the MusicLab experiments and considers
50 songs and simulations with 20,000 steps. The songs are displayed in a single column.
The analysis in [10] indicated that participants are more likely to sample songs higher in
the playlist. More precisely, the visibility decreases with the playlist position, except for
a slight increase at the bottom positions. Figure 2.1 depicts the visibility profile based on
these guidelines, which is used in all computational experiments in this paper.
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Figure 2.1: The visibility vp (y-axis) of position p in the playlist (x-axis) where p = 1 is the
top position and p = 50 is the bottom position of the playlist which is displayed in a single
column.
Figure 2.2: The Quality qi (blue) and Appeal Ai (red) of Song i in the two settings. In the
first setting, the quality and the appeal for the songs were chosen independently according
to a Gaussian distribution normalized to fit between 0 and 1. The second setting explores
an extreme case where the quality is negatively correlated with the appeal.
The paper also uses two settings for the quality and appeal of each song, which are
depicted in Figure 2.2:
1. In the first setting, the quality and the appeal for the songs were chosen independently
according to a Gaussian distribution normalized to fit between 0 and 1.
2. The second setting explores an extreme case where the quality is negatively correlated
with the appeal.
The experimental results were obtained by running W = 400 simulations.
2.3 The Ranking Policies
This section reviews a number of ranking policies used to influence the participants. Each
policy updates the order of the songs in the playlist and thus defines a different “measure
and react” algorithm that uses the policy to present a novel playlist after each refresh.
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The first policy is called the download ranking [17]: At iteration k, it simply orders
the songs by the number of downloads Di,k and assigns the positions 1..n in that order to
obtain the σdk. Note that downloads do not necessarily reflect the inherent quality of the
songs, since they depend on how many times the songs were listened to.
The second policy is the performance ranking which maximizes the expected number
of downloads at each iteration, exploiting all the available information globally, i.e., the
appeal, the visibility, the downloads, and the quality of the songs.
Definition 2.1. The performance ranking σ∗k at iteration k is defined as
σ∗k = arg max
σ∈Sn
n∑
i=1
pi,k(σ) · qi.
The performance ranking uses the probability pi,k(σ) of sampling song i at iteration k given
ranking σ, as well as the quality qi of song i. Obviously, in practical situations, the song
qualities are unknown. However, as mentioned in the introduction, Salganik et al. [17]
argue that the popularity of a song (at least in the independent condition) can be used as
a measure of its quality. Hence, the quality qi in the above expression can be replaced by
its approximation qˆi,k at iteration k as discussed later in the paper.
It is not obvious a priori how to compute the performance ranking: In the worst case,
there are n! rankings to explore. Fortunately, the performance ranking can be computed
efficiently (in strongly polynomial time) through a reduction to the Linear Fractional As-
signment Problem.
Theorem 2.2. The performance ranking can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
Proof. We show that the performance ranking problem can be polynomially reduced to the
Linear Fractional Assignment Problem (LFAP). The LFAP, which we state below, is known
to be solvable in polynomial time in the strong sense [20, 9].
A LFAP input is a bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E) where |V1| = |V2| = n, and a cost
cij and a weight dij > 0 for each edge (i, j) ∈ E. The LFAP amounts to finding a perfect
matching M minimizing ∑
(i,j)∈M cij∑
(i,j)∈M dij
.
To find the performance ranking, it suffices to solve the LFAP problem defined over a
bipartite graph where V1 represents the songs, V2 represents the positions, ci,j = −vj(αAi+
Di)qi and dij = vj(αAi + Di). This LFAP instance determines a perfect matching M
such that
−∑(i,j)∈M vj(αAi+Di)qi∑
(i,j)∈M vj(αAi+Di)
is minimized. The result follows since this is a polynomial
reduction.
In the following, we use D-rank and P-rank to denote the “measure and react” algo-
rithms using the download and performance rankings respectively. We also annotate the
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algorithms with either SI or IN to denote whether they are used under the social influ-
ence or the independent condition. For instance, P-rank(SI) denotes the algorithm with
the performance ranking under the social influence condition, while P-rank(IN) denotes
the algorithm with the performance ranking under the independent condition. We also
use rand-rank to denote the algorithm that simply presents a random playlist at each
iteration. Our proposed M&O algorithm is P-rank(SI).
Under the independent condition, the optimization problem is the same at each iter-
ation as the probability pi(σ) does not change over time. Since the performance ranking
maximizes the expected downloads at each iteration, it dominates all other “measure and
react” algorithms under the independent condition.
Proposition 2.3 (Optimality of Performance Ranking). Given specified songs appeal and
quality, P-rank(IN) is the optimal “measure and react” algorithm under the independent
condition.
2.4 Recovering the Songs Quality
This section describes how to recover songs quality in the MusicLab. It shows that “mea-
sure and react” algorithms quickly recover the real quality of the songs.
As mentioned several times already, Salganik et al. [17] stated that the popularity of
a song in the independent condition is a natural measure of its quality and captures both
its intrinsic “value” and the preferences of the participants. To approximate the quality of
a song, it suffices to sample the participants. This can be simulated by using a Bernoulli
sampling based on real quality of the songs. The predicted quality qˆi of song i is obtained
by running m independent Bernoulli trials with probability qi of success, i.e.,
qˆi =
k
m
,
where k is the number of successes over the m trials. The law of large numbers states that
the prediction accuracy increases with the sampling size. For a large enough sampling size,
qˆi has a mean of qi and a variance of qi(1−qi). This variance has the desirable property that
the quality of a song with a more ’extreme’ quality (i.e., a good or a bad song) is recovered
faster than those with average quality. In addition, “measure and react” algorithms merge
additional information about downloads into the prediction as the experiment proceeds: At
step k, the approximate quality of song i is given by
qˆi,k =
qˆi,0 ·m+Di,k
m+ Si,k
,
where m is the initial sample size and Si,k the number of samplings of song i up to step k.
Figure 2.3 presents experimental results about the accuracy of the quality approximation
for different rankings, assuming an initial sampling set of size 10. More precisely, the figure
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Figure 2.3: Average Squared Difference of Inferred Quality over Time for Different Rankings
for the top 10 quality songs. The figure reports the average squared difference
∑n
i=1
(qˆi,k−qi)2
n
between the song quality and their predictions for the various ranking policies under the
social influence and the independent conditions.
reports the average squared difference
n∑
i=1
(qˆi,k − qi)2
n
between the song quality and their predictions for the various ranking policies under the
social influence and the independent conditions. In all cases, the results indicate that the
songs quality is recovered quickly and accurately. Observe that the performance ranking
recovers the song quality faster than the other rankings, both in the social influence and in
the independent conditions.
2.5 Expected Performance
This section studies the expected performance of the various rankings under the social
influence and the independent conditions. The performance ranking uses the quality ap-
proximation presented in the last section (instead of the “true” quality). Figures 2.4 and
2.5 depict the average number of downloads for the various rankings given the quality and
appeal data depicted in Figure 2.2.
The experimental results highlight three significant findings:
1. The performance ranking provides substantial gains in expected downloads compared
to the download ranking and the random ranking policies, both in the social influence
and the independent conditions.
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Figure 2.4: The Number of Downloads over Time for the Various Rankings (Independent
Gaussian Setting). The x-axis represents the number of song samplings and the y-axis
represents the average number of downloads over all experiments. The left figure depicts the
results for the social influence condition and the right figure for the independent condition.
2. The benefits of the performance ranking are particularly striking under the social
influence condition. Social influence creates a Matthew effect [16] for the number of
expected downloads.
3. The gain of the performance ranking is also more significant on the worst-case sce-
nario, where the song appeal is negatively correlated with the song quality. The
expected number of downloads is lower in this worst-case scenario, but the shapes
of the curves are in fact remarkably similar in the social influence and independent
conditions.
In summary, the performance ranking produces significant improvements in expected down-
loads over the download ranking, which also dominate the random ranking. The benefits
come both from position bias and social influence which provide cumulative improvements.
2.6 Market Unpredictability
Figure 2.6 depicts the unpredictability results using the measure proposed in [17]. The
unpredictability ui of song i is defined as the average difference in market share for that
song between all pairs of realizations, i.e.,
ui =
W∑
w=1
W∑
w′=w+1
|mi,w −mi,w′ |/
(
W
2
)
,
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Figure 2.5: The Number of Downloads over Time for the Various Rankings (Negative
Correlation Setting). The x-axis represents the number of song samplings and the y-axis
represents the average number of downloads over all experiments. The left figure depicts the
results for the social influence condition and the right figure for the independent condition.
where mi,w is the market share of song i in world w, i.e.,
mi,j = D
j
i,N/
n∑
k=1
Dji,N
where Dwi,t is the number of downloads of song i at step t in world w. The overall unpre-
dictability measure is the average of this measure over all n songs, i.e.,
U =
n∑
j=1
ui/n.
The figure highlights two interesting results.
1. Exploiting social influence does not necessarily create an unpredictable market. In
the first setting, the performance ranking introduces only negligible unpredictability
in the market. This obviously contrasts with the download ranking, which introduces
significant unpredictability.
2. An unpredictable market is not necessarily an inefficient market. In the second setting,
the performance ranking exploits social influence to provide significant improvements
in downloads although, as a side-effect, it creates more unpredictability. Subsequent
results will explain the source of this unpredictability.
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Figure 2.6: The Unpredictability of the Rankings for the Unpredictability Measure of [17].
The measure of unpredictability ui for song i is defined as the average difference in mar-
ket share for that song between all pairs of realizations, i.e., ui =
∑W
j=1
∑W
k=j+1 |mi,j −
mi,k|/
(
W
2
)
, where mi,j is the market share of song i in world j. The overall unpredictability
measure is the average of this measure over all n songs, i.e., U =
∑n
j=1 ui/n.. The left
figure depicts the results for the first setting, while the right figure depicts the results for
the second setting.
2.7 Downloads Versus Quality
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 report the correlation between number of downloads of a song (y-axis)
and its true quality (x-axis) for each of the rankings. More precisely, the figures show the
distributions of the downloads of every song over the simulations. The songs are ranked
in increasing quality on the x-axis and there are 400 dots for each song, representing the
number of downloads in each of the experiments. As a result, the figures give a clear visual
representation of what happens in the MusicLab for the various rankings, including how
the downloads are distributed and the sources of unpredictability.
The results are particularly interesting. In the first setting depicted in Figure 2.7, P-
rank(SI) clearly isolates the best song, which has an order of magnitude more downloads
than other songs. When comparing with P-rank(SI) and P-rank(IN), we observe that the
additional market efficiency produced by P-rank(SI) primarily comes from the downloads
of this best song. In contrast, the download ranking has a lot more unpredictability and
has significant download counts for many other songs, even for some with considerably less
quality. The variance of downloads for the best song is substantial, indicating that there
are simulations in which this best song has very few downloads. This never happens with
the performance ranking.
The results in Figure 2.8 highlight the source of unpredictability in the performance
ranking. These results are for the second setting where the appeal is negatively correlated
with the quality. The results indicate that the performance ranking is not capable of isolat-
ing the best song in this setting. There are significant downloads of the next high-quality
songs however. This also contrasts with the download ranking where lower-quality songs
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Figure 2.7: The Distribution of Downloads Versus the True Song Qualities (First Setting).
The songs on the x-axis are ranked by increasing quality from left to right. Each dot is the
number of downloads of a song in an experiment.
can have substantial downloads. It is interesting to point out that the unpredictability of
the performance ranking in this setting comes from songs which are not easy to distinguish:
These songs have very similar values for quality and appeal.
These results shed interesting light on social influence. First, the download ranking
clearly shows that social influence can transform average songs into “hits”. However, this
behavior is entirely eliminated by the performance ranking in the first setting: The per-
formance ranking clearly leverages social influence to isolate the “blockbuster”. The second
setting highlights a case where even the performance ranking cannot recover the best song.
This setting is of course a worst-case scenario: A terrific product with a poor appeal. How-
ever, the performance ranking still leverages social influence to promote high-quality songs:
Social influence under the performance ranking is much less likely to turn an average song
into a “hit” compared to the download ranking.
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Figure 2.8: The Distribution of Downloads Versus the True Song Qualities (Second Setting).
The songs on the x-axis are ranked by increasing quality from left to right. Each dot is the
number of downloads of a song in an experiment.
2.8 The Benefits of Social Influence
We now prove that social influence always increases the number of expected downloads of
the performance ranking. We show that this is true regardless of the number of songs, their
appeal and quality, and the visibility values. The proof assumes that the quality of the
songs has been recovered, i.e., we use qi instead of qˆi,k. Also, for simplifying the notations,
we use ai = αAi +Di,t and assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn > 0.
We are interested in showing that the expected number of downloads increases over time
for the performance ranking under the social influence condition. In state t, the probability
that song i is downloaded for ranking σ is
vσiaiqi∑
vσiai
.
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Hence, the expected number of downloads at time t for ranking σ is defined as
E[Dσt ] =
∑
i vσiaiqi∑
i vσiai
.
Under the social influence condition, the number of expected downloads over time can be
considered as a Markov chain where state t + 1 only depends on state t. Therefore the
expected number of downloads at time t + 1 conditional to time t if ranking σ and σ′ are
used at time t and t+ 1 respectively is
E[Dσ,σ
′
t+1 ] =
∑
j
(
vσjajqj∑
vσiai
·
∑
i 6=j vσ′iaiqi + vσ′j (aj + 1)qj∑
i 6=j vσ′iai + vσ′j (aj + 1)
)
+ (1− E[Dσt ]) · E[Dσt ].
Consider the performance ranking now. At step t, the performance ranking finds a permu-
tation σ∗ ∈ Sn such that
E[Dσ
∗
t ] =
∑
i vσ∗i aiqi∑
i vσ∗i ai
= max
σ
∑
i vσiaiqi∑
i vσiai
. (2.1)
By optimality of the performance ranking at each step, we have that
E[Dσ
∗,σ∗∗
t+1 ] ≥ E[Dσ
∗,σ∗
t+1 ] (2.2)
where σ∗∗ is the performance ranking at step t+ 1. Hence, to show that social influence is
always beneficial to the performance ranking, it suffices to show that
E[Dσ
∗,σ∗
t+1 ] ≥ E[Dσ
∗
t ].
The proof is simpler when reasoning about the playlist obtained by the performance ranking.
At step t, the performance ranking finds a playlist pi∗ ∈ Sn such that∑
p vpapi∗pqpi∗p∑
p vpapi∗p
= E[Dσ
∗
t ] (2.3)
By (2.3), pi∗ satisfies∑
p
vpapi∗pqpi∗p − E[Dσ
∗
t ]
∑
p
vpapi∗p =
∑
p
vpapi∗p
(
qpi∗p − E[Dσ
∗
t ]
)
= 0. (2.4)
Consider the function
f(λ) = max
pi
∑
p
vpapi∗p
(
qpi∗p − λ
)
.
Function f is concave and strictly decreasing and hence its unique zero is the optimal value
E[Dσ∗t ]. Furthermore, the optimality condition for pi in function f can be characterized by
a " rearrangement inequality" which states that the maximum is reached if and only if
api∗1
(
qpi∗1 − λ
) ≥ · · · ≥ api∗n (qpi∗n − λ) ∀λ ∈ R. (2.5)
We are now in position to state our key theoretical result.
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Theorem 1. The expected downloads are nondecreasing over time when the performance
ranking is used to select the playlist.
Proof. By Equation 2.2, it suffices to show that
E[Dσ
∗,σ∗
t+1 ] ≥ E[Dσ
∗
t ].
Let a = a1, · · · , an represent the current state at time t. For ease of notation, we rename
the songs so that σ∗i = i. We also drop the ranking superscript σ
∗ from the download
notation. Denote the optimal expected number of downloads at time t as
E[Dt] =
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
= λ∗.
Then, the expected number of downloads in time t+ 1 conditional to time t is
E[Dt+1] =
∑
j
(
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i 6=j viaiqi + vj(aj + 1)qj∑
i 6=j viai + vj(aj + 1)
)
+
(
1−
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
)
·
∑
i viaiqi∑
i viai
=
∑
j
(
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i viaiqi + vjqj∑
i viai + vj
)
+
(
1−
∑
j vjajqj∑
i viai
)
· λ∗.
Proving
E[Dt+1] ≥ E[Dt] (2.6)
amounts to showing that
∑
j
(
vjajqj∑
viai
·
∑
i viaiqi + vjqj∑
i viai + vj
)
+
(
1−
∑
j vjajqj∑
i viai
)
· λ∗ ≥ λ∗.
which reduces to proving
1∑
i viai
∑
j
[
v2jajqj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ∗)
]
≥ 0
or, equivalently, ∑
j
[
v2jajqj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ∗)
]
≥ 0. (2.7)
By the rearrangement inequality (2.5), the performance ranking at step t produces a playlist
pi satisfying
api∗1
(
qpi∗1 − λ∗
) ≥ · · · ≥ api∗n (qpi∗n − λ∗) .
16
Therefore, if ai (qi − λ∗) ≥ aj (qj − λ∗), then vi ≥ vj for any i, j ∈ N . Hence, the perfor-
mance rank allocates all songs with a negative term after the songs with a positive term.
Define P1 = {i ∈ N | (qi − λ∗) ≥ 0} and P2 = {i ∈ N | (qi − λ∗) < 0}. It follows that vi ≥ vj
for all i ∈ P1, j ∈ P2. Inequality (2.7) can be rewritten as follows:∑
j∈P1
[
vjajqjvj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ∗)
]
+
∑
j∈P2
[
vjajqjvj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ∗)
]
≥ 0.
By definition of P1 and P2, the terms in the left summation are positive and the terms in
the right summation are negative. Additionally, for any c > 0,
vi
c+ vi
≥ vj
c+ vj
⇔ (c+ vj)vi ≥ (c+ vi)vj ⇔ cvi ≥ cvj ⇔ vi ≥ vj
Hence, since v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn,
v1∑
i viai + v1
≥ v2∑
i viai + v2
≥ . . . ≥ vn∑
i viai + vn
.
Let v = mini∈P1 vi the smallest visibility assigned to an item in P1. By the rearrangement
inequality (2.5), v ≥ maxi∈P2 vi. Similarly, let q = mini∈P1 qi. By definiton of P1 and P2,
q ≥ maxi∈P2 qi. These observations leads to the following inequality:∑
j∈P1
[
vjajqjvj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ∗)
]
+
∑
j∈P2
[
vjajqjvj∑
i viai + vj
(qj − λ∗)
]
≥ vq∑
i viai + v
∑
j∈P1
[ajvj (qj − λ∗)] +
vq∑
i viai + v
∑
j∈P2
[ajvj (qj − λ∗)]
=
vq∑
i viai + v
n∑
j=1
[ajvj (qj − λ∗)] .
By Equation 2.4,
n∑
j=1
[ajvj (qj − λ∗)] = 0
and the result follows.
Corollary 2. In expectation, the P-ranking policy under social influence achieves more
downloads than the any ranking policy under the independent condition.
This corollary follows directly from the fact that the expected downloads at each step do
not change under the independent condition regardless of the ranking policy in use.
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3 Discussion
This paper presented a “measure and optimize” algorithm for the MusicLab which com-
putes, at each refresh step, an optimal ranking of the songs, given the appeal, estimated
quality, current download counts, and position visibility. This performance ranking, which
maximizes the expected number of downloads, can be computed in strongly polynomial
time, making the M&O algorithm highly scalable. Our experimental results reveal two key
findings:
1. TheM&O algorithm leverages social influence to bring significant benefits in expected
downloads.
2. Social influence and position bias both bring improvements in expected downloads
and their effects are cumulative.
Our theoretical results formally validate the first finding and prove that the performance
ranking under social influence always achieves more expected downloads than any ranking
policy under the independent condition.
Our results shed an interesting and novel light about social influence and the unpre-
dictability it creates in cultural markets. The unpredictability coming from social influence
is often presented as an undesirable property of cultural markets. However, as our exper-
imental and theoretical results show, social influence, when used properly, is guaranteed to
help in maximizing the efficiency of the market. So, unless predictability is a goal per se,
social influence should be seen as an asset for optimizing cultural markets.
Our results also show that, in reasonable settings and with a performance ranking, the
unpredictability created by the use of social influence is small. Moreover, the performance
ranking identifies “blockbusters” and these “blockbusters” are the primary reason for the
increased efficiency of the market. There are conditions in the MusicLab where the best
song is not recovered and does not have the most downloads. This happens when the
best song has a “bad” appeal and is dominated by another song. Assume, for instance,
that we have only two songs and q1 > q2. If v1A1q1 < v2A2q2 (v1 > v2), the added
visibility is not able to overcome the bad appeal: Song 1, despite its better quality, will
be dominated by song 2. Note however that these situations can be predicted, since these
dominance relationships can be identified. Equally important, social influence still helps in
these settings compared to policies not using it.
The unpredictability when using the performance ranking comes from songs that are
indistinguishable, i.e., Aiqi ≈ Ajqj . In this case, social influence may favor one of the
songs depending on how the process unfolds. It is interesting to point out once again that
these situations can be identified a priori. Together with the dominance relationships, these
equivalence relationships helps us identify the sources of unpredictability, i.e., which songs
may emerge in the MusicLab. Moreover, it is conceivable that we can also control this
unpredictability to ensure fairness and reduce inequalities. This is a topic we are currently
investigating.
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Our experiments have also shown that, contrary to the download ranking, the per-
formance ranking does not transform average songs into “hits”. In reasonable settings, it
always identifies the “blockbusters” while, in a worst-case scenario where song appeal is neg-
atively correlated with song quality, it still promotes high-quality songs. There is a certain
robustness in the performance ranking which is not present in the download ranking.
A key insight from this research is the need to leverage social influence carefully. The
download ranking uses social influence twice: Directly through the download counts and
indirectly through the ranking. The experimental results indicate that the resulting al-
gorithm puts too much emphasis on download counts, which are not necessarily a good
indication of quality due to the sampling process. In contrast, the performance ranking
balances appeal, quality, and social influence.
Observe that, in the generative model of the MusicLab, the perceived quality of a
song is not affected by social influence: Only the probability of listening to the song is. Our
results continue to hold when the perceived quality of a song is affected by social influence
[12, 5, 15], e.g., when the perceived quality of song i is improved by i ≥ 0, when song i is
downloaded. Similarly, the results generalize to the case where the sampling probability is
given by
pi,k(σ) =
vσi(αAi + f(Di,k))∑n
j=1 vσj (αAj + f(Dj,k))
,
where function f is positive nondecreasing.
We hope that these results will revive the debate about the consequences of social
influence. Our results show that social influence is beneficial for the efficiency of the market
and that much of its induced unpredictability can be controlled. It appears that a key issue
is to continue building our understanding of the nature of social influence and to determine
how best to use it and for which purposes: Efficiency, predictability, fairness, ...
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